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Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative
Dispute Resolution or Coercive
Dispute Suppression?
Sharona Hoffman*
The enforceability of mandatory arbitration policies contained in employment contracts between employees and their direct employers remains
an open question, even after the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer
v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp. While Gilmer gave effect to a mandatory
arbitration clause in a contract between a securities broker and his licensing exchange, the Court noted that the contract atissue was not an ordinary
employment contraCt between employer and employee. The Court declined
to decide whether arbitration agreements in ordinary employment contracts
are per se enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act or whether these
provisions are exempt from the Act ancd therefore subject to closer judicial
scrutiny.
Sharona Hoffman (,!rgues that arbitration provisions in ordinary employment contracts are beyond the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, a
conclusion consistent with the approach of the majority of courts of appeal
which have· consi[/ered this issue.
To demonstrate the continuing development of the law governing the
enforcement of mandatory arbitration policies, the author details a recent
case in which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenged
and successfUlly enjoined enforcement of a mandatory arbitration policy.
The arbitration policy was. VJ.~lnerable to attack because its provisions so
clearly favored the ·employer and because pre-existing employees were
forced to choose between keeping their jobs or prospectively agreeing to
arbitrate nearly all disputes under the terms of the employer's arbitration
policy.
•
Hoffman concludes that while voluntary alternative dispute resolution
schemes are enforceable, mandatory arbitration policies unilaterally imposed by empioyers upon employees may be voidable under both statutory
law and the common law of contracts.

* B.A. Wellesley College 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School 1988. Ms. Hoffman is a Senior Trial
Attorney in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Houston District Office and an adjunct
professor at South Texas College of Law. The views expressed in this article represent the personal
views and opinions of its author and are not intended io represent the views of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or any other United States governmental agency.
© Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Volume 17, No. I, 1996.
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I
lNTRODUCTION

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been hailed as a welcome
vehicle for the reduction of the length and cost of litigation, the alleviation
of unmanageable backlogs in the· courts-, ·and the general enhancement of
efficiency in the American legal system. Alternative dispute resolution is
perceived as so desirable that provisions encouraging its use have been incorporated into'the texts· ofvarious statutes. 1 ·
Mandatdry' irroitration policies in the employment context are becoming increasingly ~o~on. An article appearing in the January/February
Lawyer advised law firms "to consider in1995 issue ofthe
cluding in their letters of engagement a mandatory-arbitration provision requiring both parties to resolve any disputes arising under the agreement via
arbitration."2 The article justified its recommendation by statirig that "[t]his
procedure will greatly reduce the;: cost of resolving such disputes and expedite final disposition= of employrrierit controversies. " 3
·.As alternative:di!!P]Jteresolp.tip;nhas,grown in popularity,_however, so
article will focus on the phenomenon of
has its potential for abuse.
mandatory arbitration policies which are unilaterally implemented by employers through eihploynieiltcontracts, employee manuals, or separate policy memorancta; En:ipioyees who wish to obtain employment or retain their

Washzngton

f
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.
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This

I. See, e.g., seciion 118oftheCivil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 note (1994); section
513 of the Americans with Disabilities Aet, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12212 (1995).
2. Francis T. Coleman, Rethinking Personnel Strategies, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, January/
February 1995, at 32, 35.
3. !d.
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positions with employers who have instituted compulsory arbitration programs are thereby forced to relinquish their rights of access to the courts
and to agree to resolve most, if not all, disputes solely through arbitration.
Alongside the advantages of arbitration, namely; overall cost reduction, increased efficiency, and expedited dispute resolution, there exist several distinct disadvantages. A report issued by the General Accounting
Office in March 1994 examined arbitration procedl.lres utilized in the securities industry and highlighted several startling realities. 4 The report found
that in 1992, 89 percerit-of New York Stock Exchange (N.Y.S.E.) arbitrators were white menwith an average age of 60. 5 Some claimants, particularly those with allegations of discrimination, may find the lack of diversity
among arbitrators to. be quite troubling; since they may have difficulty finding an arbitrator whose background makes him sympathetic to their claims.
The same report concluded that N.Y.S.E. and National Association of Securities Dealers (N,A.S.D.) arbitrators handling employment discrimination
cases are not necessarily employnient discrimination law experts. 6 Scholars
have long urged that arbitrators mustbe trained to jnsure their expertise in
the substantive areas of law involved in.the cases they handle. 7 One writer,
Judge Harry T. Edwards, cautions that "[i]nexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudication is not always synonymous withfair andjust adjudication" since "decisionm;Ucers may not understand the values at stake. and
parties to disputes do not alw~ys possess equal power and resources." 8
It has also been noted that some statutory remedies are not available
when claims are arbitrated. New York law, for example, prohibits the
award of punitive damages in arbitration. 9
4. HEALTH, EoucATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, UNTIED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-17, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITIEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND FINANCE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HoUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES. (MARCH
1994).
5. /d. at 2, 8.
6. /d. at 12.
7. Hany T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REv.
668, 683 (1986).
8. /d. at 679.
9. In Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that an arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages even if agreed upon by the parties. The
court explained its decision as follows:
The evil of permitting an arbitrator whose selection is often restricted or manipulatable by the
party in a superior bargaining positicin,to award punitive damages is that it displaces the court
and the jury, and therefore the State, as the engine for iinposing a social sanction .... If
arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the usefulness of arbitration would be
destroyed. It would become a trap for the unwary given the eminently desirable freedom from
judicial overview of law and facts. It would mean that the scope of determination by arbitrators, by the license to award punitive damages, would be both unpredictable and
uncontrollable.
/d. at 796.
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Furthermore, unlike federal judges, who are appointed for life, and unlike jurors, whose livelihoods are not dependent upon the decisions they
make, arbitrators must· be selected by the parties for each arbitration· they
conduct. 19 · Judge ]tdwards warns- t]?.at-- ~'[t]her~ are now a number of selfproclaimed ADR 'experts' with business cards in hand and consulting firms ·
in the yellow pages, advertising an ability to solve any dispute." 11 This
critique suggests that participants in the ADR industry may not always have
pure motives, 12
A dang~r eXists that'tbe deCisions ~cif some arbitrators may be motivated, at .least: in J>~,' by a desire to _secure- their own future employment.
Since an indi-vidual employeejs uirlikely to utilize arbitration frequently,
whereas employers are often repeatedly sued, the arbitrator may recognize
that he· or she stands to bi:mefit-from providing the employer with a
favorable decision: By contrast~ an"arbitrator who awards punitive damages
to an employee in a particular case niay be deemed an extremist and may be
rejected by
iii futW:e arbitrations. In fact; Under some employment-related arbitration agreements, theemployer is solely responsible for
selecting the atbltrator, 13 since presli!Jlably the employer is more likely to
have the kriowledge wd resomces to: do so, Under such circumstances it
may.be particularlydifficult to ihstire:arbitrator impartiality.
In addition, an arbitrator's error of law does not ordinarily constitute
grounds for vacating the award unless the award demonstrates a manifest
disregard forthdaw. 14 A manifest disregard ofthe law can be proven only
if it is "demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately disregarded what the)'_lm~wto be_the law~in order to reach the result they did." 15
In light of the highly deferential standard of judicial review of arbitration
awards,l 6 some arbitrators may have little incentive to engage in rigorous,
responsible analysis ·in reaching· their decisions, As one scholar has obser\red, "[a]djudjtatioiiismoielikely to do justice than ... arbitration ... or
any other contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of the
state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible,
and who are committed to reason."17

employers

10. See, e.g., infra note 27.
II. Edwards, supra riote 7, at 683.
12. Jd.
13. Fair Einplo:Ym¥nt P;ractices'suminary of Latest Developments, March 13, 1995 at 27. This
issue summarizes discussions that were held regarding the arbitration of employment discrimination
disputes at the DistricrofColurnbia Bar's convention in Washington, D.C. and at a meeting of the
American Bm: Assot:iati6n•s eonlinirlee on ~bor Arbitra:tion ~nd the Law of Collective Bargaining
Agreements.
14. See Health Services !\1aJl!lg~ment Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992);
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 E2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. Hughes, 975 F.Zd at 1267.
16. Jd.
17. Owen Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
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It is also significant that arbitration awards have no precedential value
for purposes offuture litigation. Arbitration provides for the resolution of
potentially important questions of law in a private forum. Judge Edwards
offered the folloWing admonition:
Additionally, by diverting particular types of cases away from adjudication,
we may stifle the development of law fu certain disfavored areas of law.
Imagine, for example, the impoverished nature of civil rights law that would
have resulted had all race disCrimination cases in the sixties and seventies
been mediated rather than adjudicated. The wholesale diversion of cases
·involving ~-e legal rights of ibe poor t;nay resu1t it:l, the p~finition of these
rights by the powerful in our: society· rather than by the· application of fundamental societal values reflected in the nile of law. 1·8
It ha~ been said that" 'voluntar-y binding arbitration' is about as voluntary as deciding to hand over one's money to a mugger." 19 These sentiments_ are ·echo~d by many who are active in the arena of employee civil
rights.Z 0 Proininent among the opponents ofniandatory, binding arbitration
is the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the govertlplental agency entnistedwith enforcillg the federal statutes which
outlaw discrimination in the Workplace. 21 .The EEOC recently litigated a
case in which it successfully challenged a mandatory arbitration policy
which was implemented in December of 1994 by a Houston company,
River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic (ROID)P
This article argues that comptilsory arbitration agreements for workplace disputes are Unlawful and should not be enforced by the courts. In
formulating this arglllllent, the paper will analyze the ROID case and its
implications. In addition, the Federal Arbitration Act2 3 wiil be examined,
as it applies to employment contracts. An analysis of the relevant Supreme
Court and coUrt of appeals cases will suggest that the Federal Arbitration
Act's exemption, found in section 1 of the .statute, should be read expansively to exclude all contracts of employment from the purview ofthe_Federal Arbitration Act. Finally, the thesis will be bolstered by several
concepts drawn from traditional contract law, including the public policy
defense, duress, and unconscionability.
18.

Edwards, supra note 7, at 679:

19. Fair Employment Practices Summary of Latest Developments, supra note 13. Statement made
by Mark Schneider, associate general counsel for the International Association of Machinists.
20. See Joann S. Lublin, Companies Try to Prevent Fired Executives from Suing, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 1995, at B1; Nina Schuyler, EEOC Comes Out Against Mandatory Arbitration, S.F. DAILY J.,
May 18, 1995, at 1; Julie Brienza, Federal EEOC Says Workers Deserve Recourse, Not Mandatory
Arbitration, TRIAL, August 1_995, at 16.
21.

See, e.g., id.

22. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, Civil Action No. H-95-755 (S.D. Tex. filed March 15, 1995).
23.

9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-307 (West Supp. 1995).
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n
CASE STUDY OF MANDATORY

ALTERNATIVE DisPUTE REsoLUTION IN THE
E:M:PLOYMENT ARENA

ROID is a large outpatient imaging and diagnostic center located in
Hou!)ton, Texas, whiclJ. e]llploys over 100 people. At the end of 1994 ROID
implemented a mandatory arbitration policy u:ilder which the parties
"agreed" to thecres(\)lu:tion;by"arbitratipncof all controversies that may arise
between the empioyer and elp,ployee, \Vith a_ few very limited exseptions. 24
The alter,native dispute ·resoiution · policy required employees to pay
half the cost of'aibitraticin, and under certain circumstances, to pay the. employer's atto:rney's fees if the employer prevailed. 25 Under such a policy,
an employee· who had been terminated and was unemployed may be unable
to afford arbitration, and havipg waived access to the co,wts by signing the
arbitration pplicy j would have rio -recourse to. any· dispute resolution
mechanism. 26
.
24. Memorandum ofLawin Support of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Application for a TernjlOriiry Restraining Order. andPTelirniriary Injunction, Exhibit F, page I, United States
Equal Employment Opportunity .Commission v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, Civil Action No. H95-755 (S.D. Tex., filed March 15, 1995) (on file with author). The full text of the provision reads as
follows:
.
·

Claims Covered by the Agreement
The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims or
controversies ("clanris''), whether or not arising out of my employment (or its termination),
that the Company may have against me or that I may have against the Company or against its
officers, directors, employees, or agents .in their capacity as such or otherwise. The claims
covered by'tllisA:greement'iricliitle;hut are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due; clainis for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims;
claims for discrimination (including, but not limited to race, sex, religion, national origin, age,
marital. stl!tus, oqneclical conditkm,handicap, or disability); claims for benefits (except where
an employee·fienefit or pension" plan specifies that its claims procedure shall culminate in an
arbitration procedure different'lrom this one), and claims for violation of any federal, state, or
other governinental Jaw, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded in the following paragraph. ·
Claims Not Covered by the Agreement
Claims I 111liY have for Workers' Compensation or unemployment compensation benefits
are not covered by this Agreement.
Also not covered are claims by the Company for injunctive and/or other equitable relief
for unfair competition and/or the ·use and/or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, as to which I understand and agree that the Company may seek and obtain
relief froril a COUrt of competent juriSdiction.
25. /d. at 3-4. The specific provision is as follows:
Arbitration Fees ~nd
The Co~pany and I shall equally share the fees and costs of the Arbitrator. Each party
will deposit funds or post other appropriate security for its share of the Arbitrator's fee, in an
amount and manner determined by the Arbitrator, I 0 days before the first day of hearing. -,
Each party shall pay for .its own costs and attorneys' fees, if any. However, if any party
prevails on a statutory claim which affords the prevailing party attorneys' fees, or if there is a
written agreement providing for fees, the Arbitrator may award reasonable fees to the prevailing party.
26: Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a) (1994), a party instituting a civil action pays a filing fee of only
$120. A party may then represent herself'pro se or engage an attorney who will work on a contingency
fee basis, and thus the claimant will absorb no further costs of litigation. Moreover, the filing fee may

Costs

· ·
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Under ROID's policy, Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc.
would provide the parties with a list of eleven arbitrators. The parties
would alternate striking names off the list until only one arbitrator remained. If either party were dissatisfied with the remaining arbitrator, a
new list would be obtained, and the process would begin anew.2 7 The policy, however, did not provide for disclosure of the employment backgrounds and past arbitration awards of potential arbitrators,Z8 thereby
decreasing the likelihood that employees would ma:ke informed decisions
when selecting arbitrators. Employees who had no information concerning
the arbitrators on the list provided to them would not be. able to strike those
who might be biased against them or otherwise unqualified to handle the
dispute.
The policy also stated in vague terms that ~'[t]he Arbitrator shall render
an award and opinion in the form typically rendered in labor arbitrations."29
This statement did not elucidate whether a written decision was to be issued
by the arbitrator and if so, what specific information had to be contained
therein.
Another provision in the policy required employees to notify ROID of
their claims -within· one year of the occurrence of the event in question~ 30
Although employees who signed the policy could not pursue court actions
be waived for individuals who are indigent. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (1994). Arbitration, on the otber hand,
may cost well over $1,000 per party for tbe services of the arbitrator alone. A representative "Arbitration Services and Fee Information" form distributed by tbe ADR Group in Houston, Texas, provides for
a standard fee of$250/hour per party with a $500/party minimum. See, e.g., Joseph L. Tita, Memorandum from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Group, Arbitration Services and Fee Information, January
I 995 (on file witb autbor).
27. Memorandum of Law, Exhibit F, supra note 24, at 2-3. The provision reads, in relevant part,
as follows:
Arbitration Procedures
The Company and I agree that, except as provided in this Agreement, any arbitration
shall be in accordance witb the then-current Employment Arbitration Rules of Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. ("J* A *M*S") before an arbitrator who is licensed to practice law in tbe state in which the arbitration is convened (''the Arbitrator''). The arbitration
shall take place in or near the city in which I am or was last employed by the Company.
The Arbitrator shall be selected as follows. J* A •M*S shall give each party a list of 11
arbitrators drawn from its panel of labor and employment arbitrators. Each party may strike
all names on the list it deerris unacceptable. If only one common niu:rte remains on tbe iists of
all parties, tbat individual shall be designated as the Arbitrator. If more than one common
name remains on the lists of all parties, the parties shall strike names alternately until only one
remains. The party who did not initiate tbe claim shall strike first. If no common name
remains on the lists of all parties, J* A *M*S shall furnish an additional list or lists until an
Arbitrator is selected.
28. ld.
29. ld. at 3.
30. ld. at 1-2. The provision states, in relevant part, the following:
Required Notice of All Claims [and Statute of Limitations}
The Company and I agree that tbe aggrieved party must give written notice of any claim
to the otber party [within one (I) year of the date tbe aggrieved party first has knowledge of
the event giving rise to the claim; otherwise, the claim shall be void and deemed waived even
if there is a federal or state statute of limitations which would have given more time to pursue
the claim].

138

BERKE-bE-YJQURNAD-OFEMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 17:131

on their own -behalf; they .were not prevented from filing claims of discrimination with governrilental enforcement agencies, thereby allowing these
agencies to prosecute cases based on the claims, where appropriate. 31 It is
arguable, however, that RQI[)'s I1Qti~_e provision was designed to mislead
its employees with respect to administrative filing deadlines.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a charge of employment discrimination in Texas must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days
after the allegedly milawful conduct occurred. 32 The correlative Texas stature"reqmres tlianrcnarge oecfireaewilliiii T80"da)'s 'With the Texas Com.mis"sion on Human Rights by employees who wish to iurn to the state agency. 33
Neither Title Vll Iior the cases which construe it provide· for the tolling of
this statutory limitation period in instances where employees utilize alternative dispute resolution procedures prior to filing a charge with the EEOC. 34
Thus, ROID's "generous" one yea.F notice provision may have lulled employees into inaction and induced them to miss the shorter filing deadlines
applicable to state··an.d·fedetaYenforcement agencies. /
The policy's signature page featured the subheading "Voluntary
Agreement' and contained spaces· for the signatures of the employee and a
company representative; 35 It was fo1lowed by a page entitled "Acknowledgement," which consisted· of the following language:
0

31. !d. at 3. The policy contains the following language:
Except as otherwise provided in-this Agreement, both the Company and I agree that neither of
us shall initiate or prosecute any lawsuit or administrative action (other than an administrative
charge of discrimination) in any way related to any claim covered by this Agreement.
Although the language is somewhat confusing, the parenthetical phrase "other than &!1 administrative
charge of discrimination" ·authorized· employees to ·file charges of discrimination with enforcement
agencies.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (1994). In general, charges of discrimination must be filed
within i8o days ofthe occurrence of the allegedly diScriminatory act. In states such as Texas, where
state or local agertci~s als~ ha~e authority. to. prose-cute employment discrimination cases, charges of
discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the occurrence of the alleged act of
discriminatimi.. (Where "ihe person aggrieved has iniiially instituted proceedings with a State or local
agency ... _such chargeshallbe filed ... within three hundred days.") !d.
33. TEx. LAB. CooE ANN. § 21.202 (West 1995).
34. See International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO Local 790 v.
Robbins & Myers, Inc., et al.;- 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that statutory limitation period for
filing EEOC charges of discrimination is not tolled during the pendency of grievance or arbitration
procedures provided for in a collective bargaining agreement).
35. MemorandumofLaw,Exhibit F,supra note24, at 6. The provision reads as follows:

Voluntary A'kriiiitiient ··· ·· ·· ·

···

·· ·

I ACKNO\ViEbGE THAT I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THIS AGREEMENT,
THAT I UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS, THAT ALL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN J:HE GOMPANY AND. ME RELATING TO THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN THE AGREEMENT ARE CONTMNED IN IT, AND THAT I HAVE ENTERED
INTO THE AGREEMENT VOLUNTARILY AND NOT IN RELIANCE ON ANY
PROMISES OR REPRESENTATlONS BY THE COMPANY OTHER THAN THOSE CONTAINED IN THIS AGREEMENT ITSELF.
.
I FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO DISCUSS THIS AGREEMENT WITH MY PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL AND HAVE
AVAILED MYSELF OF THAT OPPORTUNITY TO THE EXTENT I WISH TO DO SO.

. MANDATORY ARBITRATION
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I acknowledge that I have been provided with a copy ofROID's policy on
Mandatory Arbitration. I understand that my continued employment with
ROID shall be deemed as evidence of my consent to abide by this policy. I
further uilderstand that my refusal to sign this acknowledgement shall be
deemed a voluntary termination initiated by the employee. 3 6

ROID's employees were thus required to sign the policy if they wished
to retain their jobs, and, by the policy's terms, if they refused to sign, they
were deemed to have voluntarily quit. This resignation provision deprived
any employee. who resisted the policy not only of employment, but also of
the right to obtain unemplo)'IIlent (;Ompensation, which is not awarded in
cases of:resignation. 37 The policy was t>rought to, the EEOC's !!;tlention by
two women wh~ declined to sign the document and were promptly escorted
off the company's premises. 38
The EEOC challenged ROID's mandatory arbitration policy because
its specific . provisions were egregiously unfavorable to employees, .and,
more generally, on the ground that mandatory alternative dispute resolution
policies which are unilaterally imposed by employers upon their employees
are unlawful per se. 39

THE OuTcoME

OF

ill
EEOC v. ROID

AND

hs

iMPLICATIONs

On April 19, 1995, Chief Judge Norman Black of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, entered
an Order granting the EEOC's application for a preliminary injunction.40 In
the Order, Chief Judge Black found that "the EEOC has shown by a preponderance nfthe evidence that the so-called 'ADR Policy' ofROID is so
misleading and against the principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that its use violates such law."41 The court revoked the mandatory
alternative dispute resolution policy which ROID had unilaterally imposed
upon its employees. 42 The Preliminary Injunction further instructed that
ROID could not in the future implement an alternative dispute resolution
policy which would require employees to pay the costs of alternative dispute resolution proceedings or which would interfere with employees'
36. ld. at 7.
37. See, e.g., TEX. LAB. ConE ANN.§ 207.045(a) (West 1995) ("An individual is disqualified for
benefits if the individual left the individual~s last work voluntarily without good cause connected with
the individual's work.").
38. Memorandum of Law, supra note 24, at 6-7, Exhibits D, E (on file with author).
39. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, Civil Action No. H-95-755 (S.D. Tex. filed March 15, 1995).
40. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 1243, 1243-44 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
41. Id. at 1243.
42. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, April 17, 1995, at 78.
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rights to ·file ·EEOC charges or to file suit once administrative remedies
have been exhausted. 43
During the Preliminary Injunction hearing, which concluded on April
17, 1995, Chief Judge Black stated that he found the arbitration policy's
"Acknowledgement" provision to be fraudulent, since rather than being an
acknowledgement of receipt
of the policy, it bound employees
to the policy
.
I
itself.4.4 The court also criticized the notice provision which instructed employees that they could inform ROID of their claims anytime within one
year· orme- occurr~ce"~ortncralreged \¥rongs. 45 The coilit stated that this
provision could. easily ·lull employees· into inaction and mislead them with
respect to the EEOC'~ 300 day filing deadline. 46 The court in ROID thus
ii:ivaiidated the ~lternative dispute re~olution policy at issue based on its
·specific provisions, which the court deemed to have contravened Title
VII.47 The case was ultimately rese>lved via a consent order, which permanently revoked ROID's ADR Policy and was entered bythe court on June
23, 1995;48
.
.
'
Chief Judge Black· was specific in his reasons for revoking ROID 's
arbitration policy and focused upon particular provisions which he found to
violate Title VII. The ROID case, therefore, does not set a precedent mandating that all mandatory ai"bitration"-j)olicies are per se urJa\vfuL Ho\vever,
it is significant that the court did not blindly uphold the mandatory arbitration policy, but rather, scrutinized it and was persuaded by the EEOC's
arguments regarding its illegality. The EEOC's successful action should
encourage others to challenge arbitration policies which are imposed upon
employees in _<}. coe!~ive and abusive fashion.
Moreover, the EEOC continues to oppose all binding arbitration policies whichare unilaterally imposed upon employees as a condition of employment.49 A study of case law; statutory law, and applicable legislative
history reveals ample support for the EEOC's position and for the invalidation of compulsory alternative dispute resolution policies in the employment context. .
43.

67 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1243-44.

44- Transcript, Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Aprill7, 1995 at 77 (on file with author) ("On its
face the provision for the employee to ackDowledge receipt is an acceptance of the policy, just as if they
signed ~ contract~')
45. ld.
46. Jd.
47. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1243.
48. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, No. H-94-755 (S.D. Tex. Jurie 23, 1995) (Consent order) at 3.
49. On July 17, 1995 the EEOC issued a Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution. The
Statement explained that "[t]he Commission believes that parties must knowingly, willingly and voluntarily enter into an ADR proceeding." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 0PPORTIJNITV CoMMISSION, LEGAL SERVICES, OFFICE oF LEGAL CoUNsEL, NOTICE No. 915.002 AT 3 (JULY 17, 1995).
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IV
THE

FEDERAL ARBITRA noN AcT AND THE CAsEs

INTERPRETING' THE STATUTE-'UNTI..ATERALLY
IMPOSED MANDATORY .ARBITRATION

PRovisioNs oN THIN leE

A.

The Supreme Court's Gilmer Decision

In 1974 the Suprem~ Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. · that an individual does not forfeit his 'private cause of action_ if he first
pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause
of a collective-bargaining agreement. 5 1 The Court explained:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement By contrast,
in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these
contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were
violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums. 52 .
The Court also emphasized that "there can be no prospective waiver of an
employe_e's rights under Title VTI."53
The Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the Alexander decision. However, in 1991 the Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson Lane Corp. 54 that a security broker's age discrimination claim was
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in his New York Stock Exchange securities registration application. 55 By signing the agreement, the individual had thus waived access to
a judicial forum with respect to his allegation of discrimination.
The Court pointed to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), codified ~n
1947 as Title 9 of the U.S. Code, which provides in relevant part as follows:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. 5 6
Section 1 of the Act excludes a particular category of contracts from
coverage under the FAA. The section provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employ50

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
!d. at 52.
/d. at 49-50.
!d. at 51.
500 u.s. 20 (1991).
!d. at 23.
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1970).
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ees, or any other .class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."57 Consequently, arbitration provisions in contracts excluded
by section 1 ofthe FAA would not be presumed valid and enforceable and
could therefore be carefully scrutinized by the courts. Arbitration provisions in contracts covered by the·FAA, however, can rarely be successfully
challenged in ajudicial forum. The question of exactly which contracts are
meant to be excluded by section 1 of the FAA has been vigorously debated
for several decades. 58
· -,
__ .. Th~~Qil..w~J;glll:t=PJ:l_eJL,t}l~t,1:}:le"'~ec_tio)l 1 exc:lJision did not. apply to
the case at bar b~~ause the a.rbitr;ition_ clause in question in the case was not
contained in a contrac:t
an employer, but rather, in a contract with a
securities excilli.nge.5 9. Th.e Supreme Court noted in a footnote that
"[s]everalamici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that that section excludes
from the coverage Ofthe FAA all 'contracts of employment.' " 60 The Court
explicitly stated thatsince Gilmer~s arbitration agreement was not found in
an ordiriary contraCt of employimmt, it chose -to leavc(for another day the
issue raiseoby
cuHae. 61 Thus, .the Shpreme Court has never defined
the scope of the exclusion found in section 1 of the FAA and has never
ruled whether an ·arbitration agreement contained in an ordinary employment contract is 'en.iarC:eable...
The dissent in :Gilmer quoted extensively from the legislative history
of the FAA. 62 The dissent explained that the Act was originally drafted to
overturn a common-law rule which precluded enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate in commercial co~tracts. 63 The dissent noted that at the hearing
related. to the proposed bill, the chaiiman of the American Bar Association
committee responsibl~ for .drafting ;the bill told senators that the bill "is-not
intended [to] be ru1 act rd'erring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act
to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to whadlieir damages are, if they want to do it. " 64
. The dissent .further quoted the following statement made by Senator
Walsh at the same hearing:

with

amid

The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in. it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either
57. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1970).
58. The FAA was originally enacted in 1925 as 43 Stat. 883, and then was reenacted and codified
in 1947 beginning at 9.U.S.C.A. § 1. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
59.. Gilmer, 500 U.S. ~i 2.5,n.2.
. ....60. ld.
61. ld.
62. ld. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. ld. See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) ("The problems Congress
faced [when passing the Act] were therefore twofold: the old common-law hostility toward arbitration, .
and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements.'').
64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S4213 and S4214 before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923)).
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you can make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same
with a good many contracts of employment. A man says, 'These are our
terms. All right, take it or leave it.' Well, there is nothing for the man to do
except sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the
court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all. 65
.
The q1,1oted legislative history of the FAA thus itself supports the conclusion that the FAA should not apply to employment contracts and that
forced arbitration of employment di.scrimiriation disputes is not to be sanctioned by the courts.
.
.·
.
. .. ·. .
. Since the issue has not b~en explicitly re~olved. bythe Supreme Court,
one might turn to a study of court of appeals cases for further elucidation.
A review of cou.rt of appeals cases, however, does not provide a consistent
answer to whether all employment contracts are excluded from coverage
under the FAA or whether the exclu~ion applies to a narrower category of
employment contracts.

B.

Court of Appeals Precedent

Several· circuits have interpreted the FAA exclusion for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" 66 as being limited to contracts
of employment of workers actively employed in the transportation industries. In Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Worker.s Local Union No. 9,61 the
Miller Brewing Company brought suit to set aside an arbitrator's award
with respect to a collective bargaining agreement's hiring preference for
employees who were laid off by a different. employer in a multi-employer
bargaining unit. 68 In considering the mandates of the FAA, the Seventh
Circuit held·that "the Act's exclusion of 'contracts of employment of. ..
workers engaged in foreign or interstate comtnerce,' 9 U.S.C. § C is inapplicable; it. ... [is] limited to workers employed in the transportation industries."69 The court thus found that the arbitration provision in question did
not fall outside the purview of the FAA.
Similarly, in Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club/ 0 the, Second
Circuit found that the Federal Arbitration Act was applicable to an arbitration provision contained in a basketball player's contract with a profes-

:,:.

65. !d.
66. 9 U.S.C.A. § I (1970).
67. 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984), cerl. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
68. !d. at 1161-62.
69. !d. at 1162. See also Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. !50; 351 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1965) (affirming lower court's granting of the union's motion to
stay the proceedings pending arbitration) ("[T]he terms 'foreign or interstate commerce,' as used in the
exemption, were not intended to apply to collective bargaining agreements similar to the one ... in the
instant case."). ·
70. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
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sional club. 71 Consequently, the court held that Erving's claim for damages
for alleged concealment and false representations, which induced him to
enter into the contract, were subject to arbitration. 72 The court explained
that "the exclusionary clause in Section 1 applied only to those actually in
the transportation industry. Erving clearly is not involved in the transportation indu~try. " 73
The First Circuit has issued contradictory decisions regarding the appli£1!1Ji_I!ty~Q:[tge _FM_~o__eJ!lpJQyt!l_<;:gt c_ontJ:acts. In a 1974 case, Dickstein
v. duPont,1 4
:FiT~d:ircuit'adiiere(ito a l1airow view of the FAA's exclusionary clause, commenting onthe appellant's contentions as follows:
Equally uriavailing is appellant's arguinent that he WaS a worker 'iengaged
in foreign or interstate commerce" within the exceptions to the Arbitration
Act set out in section 1. 9 U;S.C. § 1. Courts have generally limited this
exception to employees, unlike appellant, involved in, or closely related to,
the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce. 75.. ,
More recently, however, the First Circuit stated tha{"the USAA/ 6 by its
terms, is inapplicable to most labor contracts, see 9 U.S.C. § 1.'>77
The majority of circuits which have considered the FAA's exclusionary clause have held that its scope isbroad. 78 The Sixth Circuit, for exam-

the

71. id. at i068-69.
72. !d. at 1066-67, 1069,
73. !d. at 1069. See also Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers of America, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 91 I (1957) (granting the union
a stay of the action pending arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, thereby holding
that employees of a. manufacturer of automotive electrical equipment were not engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the FAA's exclusionary provision).
74. 443 F.2d 783, 788 (1st Cir. 1971) (affirming the district court's order staying an action for
breach of contract pending arbitration).
75. 1d. at 785. ·
76. Wben it was first enacted in 1925, the Act was named the United States Arbitration Act
(USAA). Wben the Act was codified in 1947 begiiming at 9 U.S.C.A. § I, it was not officially renamed,
but has since been customarily known as the Federal Arbitration Act. The USAA of I 925 is thus simply
an earlier name for the FAA. II IAN R. MACNEll.ET. AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw§ 5.3.1 (1994).
77. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, Inc. v. Asociacion de Empleados, 873 F.2d 479, 482 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that Puerto Rico's 30-day time bar rather than the USAA's 90-day limitation period
was applicable to an employer's suit under the Labor Management Relations Act to set aside an arbitration award). See also Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding
that the FAA's one year limitation period was not applicable to a union's suit to confirm an arbitration
award).
·
78. Courts evaluating the validity of arbitrating employment discrimination claims have not focused upon the question of whether the employees at issue are "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" in a literal sense. The pbfase "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," contained in FAA
§ 1- is generally perceived as synonymous with ·the phtase "involving commerce" in FAA § 2. II IAN R.
MACNEil. ET. AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw § 11.2.2, citing International Union United Furniture
Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Gatliff Coal Co.
v. Cox 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). The phrase "lnvol~ng commerce" bas been very broadly construed by the courts. The Tenth Circuit has stated that "[t]be requirement that the underlying transaction
involve commerce is to be broadly construed so as to be coextensive with congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause." Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (lOth Cir. 1986). The Ninth
Circuit has held that the FAA applied to a contract "[i]n light of the evidence that the construction of the
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ple, in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 1nc.,79 made the following
determination:
Based upon Congress's determination in Title VII that any employer with
15 or more employees necessarily implicates interstate commerce, any
claims implicating employment contracts with employers subject to regulation under Title VII or the ADEA would necessarily implicate interstate
commerce. Thus, all employment contracts with employers subject to regulation under Title VII~r other similar acts of Congress designed to protect
.. employees from unlawfiil discrimination and enacted pursuant to Congress's commerce power-fall within the exclusion of "contracts of employment" under §·I of the FAA. 80
.
.
Likewise, the Thlrd Circuit in Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 81 stated that " 'contracts of employment' are explicitly exempted from the F AA." 82 The Ninth Circuit in Herring v. Delta Air Lines,
Jnc., 83 a case which involved a labor dispute between pilots, their union,
and Delta Airlines, also made the general statement that the FAA "specifi70 houses was dependent to some degree on raw materials supplied from out-of-state sources ...."
Uhited States v. Nuemann Caribbean International, Ltd., 750 F.2d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, a
literal reading of the exclusion delineated in FAA § I would support the proposition that virtually all
_
employment contracts are eliminated from I:AA coverage._
A district court in Mississippi recently engaged in a thorough analysis of the issue. In relevant part,
it provided the following explanation:
[I]nterstate coinmerce at the time the FAA was enacted was generally understood to be limited
to maritime and railroad transactions. Thus, when Congress excluded employment contracts
of maritime and railroad workers, it resulted in voiding the power to eriforce arbitration
clauses _of most employment contracts. With the addition of the catch-all phrase "or any other
ciass of worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," all employment contracts would
have been excluded from the arbitration enforcement power of the FAA.· Interpreting the
exclusion phrase "engaging in commerce" as broadly as the empowering phrase "involving
commerce" does not result in neutralizing the FAA, as some courts have argued. What results
is a mechanism for enforcement of arbitration clauses which are in any contract involving
commerce; except for arbitration clauses which appear in employment contracts.
Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F.Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995). Based on this analysis
the court concluded that arbitration clauses contained in employment agreements are excluded from the
enforcement power of the FAA and denied defendant's motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. Id.
79. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
80. Jd. at 311. The Willis case, like Gilmer, involved a discrimination complaint brought by a
registered securities representative who had signed a securities registration form containing a mandatory
arbitration clause. Thus, despite the language quoted above; the court held that the complainant's sex
discrimination claims against her brokerage firm were subject to arbitration pursuant to the securities
registration form which she had executed. 948 F.2d at 312. See also Occidental Chemical v. International Chemical Workers Union, 853 F.2d 1310, 1315 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the FAA excludes labor contracts from its parameters).
81. 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
82. Jd. at 1119. The case, however, did not arise in an employment context, and thus the court
rever8ed the lower court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by
pension plan trustees against a broker, its financial consultant, and sister corporation for violations of
ERISA. ld. at 1122. But see Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers,
207 F.2d 450, 452-453 (3d Cir. 1953) (limiting the FAA's exclusionary clause to employees involved in
or closely related to the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce).
83. 894 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
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call)' excludes from coverage 'contracts of employment.' Therefore, the
appellants' reliance upon the FAA is misplaced."84 Although the employees in Herring were obviously involved in the transportation industry and
thus would fall within the FAA's exclusionary clause everi under a narrow
interpretation of its terms, it is noteworthy that the court did not limit itself
to such a ruling, but rather, explicitly construed the provision to exclude all
contracts. Of employillent
.
ItJs ~gy~!J*=tl!~! £~l}!l,C:.g~cR='!fgp,inii1R!lWeem~nts ·~qgtai!Jjl}g ~bitra
tion clauses are exch.id~d from coverage under the FAA· because, unlike
other contracts of einpldymeilt, they are' governed by section 30l(a) of the
Labor Manage,ment R~!atiops Act,85 which superseded the FAA.. In Textile
Workers Union ofAme.rica v.· Lincotn Mills of Alabatna, 86 the Supreme
. Court held thatin enacting section 301, "Congress adopted a policy which
placed sanctions bc;:hibd agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication rejecting· the,, coillDlOn·:l!lW DIJ.e ... ag11inst eAforr;ement of executory agreements to arb£trate.".87.Tbe Court thus found that section 30l(a)
required that agreements to arbitrate future disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements be spec:i:fically_enforced by the.federal courts. Since
the ·• Supreme Court 'made rio merition· of the FAA in its deCision, one may
read the Lincoln lr:1ills. qpinion as··suggestfug that the F~A~~ dOes not goVern
collective bargaining arbitration; Based on this decision, a distinction could
be made oetweeri arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining
agreements, whl~h should be exchided. from FAA coverage, and arbitration
policies contained ill other employment contracts, which have not been specifically l:lc:lQr~~~e<i by Jhe Supreme Coprt and thus should remain within the
scope of the FA:A.
The language of the FAA, however, provides no basis for differentiating betWeen colle~fiVe bargainirig. agreements and other employment COii'tracts. It is therefore arguable that if collective bargaining agreements in
general are excluded, then the FAA is inapplicable to all employment contracts. Under this theory, the fact that collective bargaining arbitration is
enforceable under a different statutory provision is irrelevant to an interpretation of the FAA's section 1 exclusion~ The courts of appeal which have
considered the issue of collective bargaining arbitration generally have, not
84. !d. at 1023.
85. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (1978) (enacted in 1947, while the FAA was enacted in 1925). The
provision reads as follows:
Suits for violation of' contracts betWeen an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industrY affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, mliy be broughi in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the pirrties, without respect· to the amount in controversy or without regard to the·
citizenship of the parties.
86. 353 u.s. 448 (1957).
87. !d. at 456.
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indicated in their decisions that collective bargaining agreements are distinguishable from other employment contracts under section 1 of the FAA.
In Domino Sugar v. Sugar Workers Local 392, 88 the Fourth Circuit
held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to disputes stemming
from collective bargaining agreements. 89 The court quoted section 1 of the
FAA as stating that nothing therein "contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of . . . any . . . class of workers engaged in interstate commerce."90 Thus, the court rejected th~ narrower interpretation of the provision, which would limit the e~Clusion to employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods. 91 The court-made no reference
to the Labor Management Relations Act and thus did not rationalize its
decision by stating that collective bargaining arbitration is enforceable
under a different statute. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit bas held that "collective bargaining agreements are 'contracts of employment' within the
meaning of the exclusion."92
In United Food & Com. Workers Local 7R v. Safeway, 93 the Tenth
Circuit held that the FAA is inapplicable to labor arbitration and consequently that an individual was not entitled to seek confirmation and enforcement under the FAA of an arbitrator's award. 94 Like the Fourth
Circuit, the Tenth Circuitrepresented that "[t]he Arbitration Act expressly
excludes from its coverage 'contracts of employment of ... any; .. workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.' " 95 The court noted that the
Supreme Court bad itself stated in United Paperworkers Int 'I Union v.
Misco, Jnc., 96 that the FAA does not apply to labor arbitration. 97 Although
the Misco decision was issued before Gilmer, it bas never been overruled by
the Supreme Court, nor should it be affected by the Gilmer decision, since,
as discussed above, Gilmer did not involve a contract between an employer
and an employee.
88. 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993).
89. Id. at 1067 (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 1).
90. ld.
91. See also Sine v. Local No. 992lnternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997, 1002
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (United States Arbitration Act does not apply to actions
concerning collective bargaining agreements); United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America
v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (denying the defendants' motion to stay
further proceedings pending completion of arbitration, stating that section I of the USAA excluded
contracts of employment of employees who produced goods for commerce as well as workers who
transported such goods).
92. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466,473 (lith Cir.
1987).
93. 889 F.2d 940 (lOth Cir. 1989).
94. Id. at 943-44.
95. ld.
96. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
97. !d. at 40, n.9 ("The Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.' ").
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The Fifth Circuit has never eXplicitly addressed the issue of whether
employment contracts are excluded from the mandate of the FAA. In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 98 the court held an arbitration Clause
contained in a stockbroker's .contract With a securities exchange to be enforceable under the FAA. 99 However, the court emphasized in a footnote
that the "arbitration clap.se was contained in the employee's contract with a
securities exchange, not with the employer." 100 The decision further cautioned that_:;~cJqUf1:s",,sHmYJLQ¥,.Jiti!lQf:Ql ~QL_tllis _,po~t:nti~l issue in future
cases." 101 The careful treauiept
char~cteii~ation of the contract in Alford implies that, if faced with the iss:ue, the Fifth Cir~:;uit will likely follow
the majority of other circuits in holding that employment contracts are excluded from coverage under the· FAA and that arbitration agreements contained therein are not necessarily ~nforceable._
A review of the case law discussed above reveals that the meaning of
the Federal Arbitration A<::t's exclusionary provision i;; crucial to resolution
of the question of whether mandatory arbitratiop agreements which are unilaterally imposed by employers are to be enforced by the courts. If employment contracts are .not generally excluded from coverage under the FAA,
the courts are bol.lnd by the statute's directive that contractual arbitration
agrec:ments are presumed "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 102 It is
only if arbitration provisions contained in employment contracts are excluded from coverage under the FAA that courts _can be free to evaluate
such provisions on a case by case basis. Both the legislative history of the
FAA and the majority of courts wl:iich have interpreted its exclusionary
provision support the proposition that all employment contracts fall outside
the scope of the Act's coverage.

and

98. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 229~230.
100. Jd. at 230. SeealsoAiford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.
1992) (citing the earlier ~eclsicm iri ~hich
Court ... already held ... that the securities registration
application containing the arbitration agreement was a contract between Alford and the securities exchanges, and nota contract with her employer." On this basis the court refused to reconsider the issue) .
. 101. Alford, 939 F:2d af23<i~ See ~lso Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th
Cir. 1995). The case involved a broker with Cigna Financial Advisors Inc. who registered with the
National Association of Securities Dealers and signed a standard ''U-4" contract, containing an arbitration clause. When he was terminated in December of 1993, he brought an age discrimination claim,
which C!GNA attempted to force into arbitration. The Fifth Circuit held that Williams' dispute was not
exempt from arbitration under section 1 of the FAA "because the agreement to arbitrate is not contained
in a contract for employment but in Williams' U-4 Registration." Jd. at 660.
102. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1970).
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v
MANDATORY ARBITRATION PoLICIES UNILATERALLY IMPosED
BY EJ'v:IPLOYERs UPON El'v:IPLOYEES SHOULD NoT BE
ENFORCEABLE UNDER TRADmONAL
CONTRACT LAw

A.

The Public Policy Defense

Compulsory arbitration policies are subject to challenge under several
principles of common law contracts doctrine, The public .policy defense
arises in the arbitration context when one party contends that an agreement
to arbitrate is unenforceable because of a legislative or judiciaL policy requiring the dispute to be litigated in court or mandating that the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate such a dispute be .otherwise limited. 103 The
public policy defense is most often used where Congress or a state legislature has created statutory rights benefiting. one party, which arguably limit
the ability to arbitrate disputes relating to those rights. 104
Public policy considerations inilitate. against the enforceability of involuntary arbitration programs governing employment discrimination disputes. The r~gbt to. be free of discrimination in the work place is· a right
created by statute. 105 The relevant statutes create private rights of action
and access to a judicial forum for victims of discrimination. 106 These statutory rights should not be curtailed by a coercive, unilaterally imposed
mandatory arbitration policy.
The Gilmer decision bas been perceived by some as precluding challenge to the mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims because it held that a security broker's age discrimination claim was subject to
compulsory arbitration. the Gilmer decision was based upon a claim
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 107 • The
ADEA contains no provision addressing the arbitrability of ADEA claims
and thus does not articulate Congressional intent regarding arbitration of
such disputes.
Two other civil rights statutes do contain sections which address the
issue of arbitration. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages
legitimate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms by .providing as
follows:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, concilia103. II IAN R. MACNEIL ET. AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw§ 16.1.1 {Supp. 1994):
104. !d.
105. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, beginning at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e {1994);
Title VII of the Americans with Disabilities Act, beginning at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 {1995); The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, beginning at 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 {1985).
106. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f){l) {1994); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117 {a) {1995); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 626{c){l) {1985).
107. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 {1985).
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tion, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title. 108
Coercive alternative dispute resolution regimens, however, do not comport
with the statutory expectations. The legislative history of section 118 discloses that Congress intended to encourage only alternative dispute mechanisms that were voluntarily adopted by all parties. Senator Robert Dole
interpreted section 118 as encouraging alternative dispute resolution "where
tlie partietr1ilioWliigly"aritl'volunlarlly elect to use th~se methods." 109
Likewise, Representative Don Edwards made the following statement:
This proviso is intended to supplement; not supplant, remedies provided by
Title VII and is notto be used, to preclu(le rights and remedies that would
otherwise be available. This section1s intended to be'consistent with decisions such as Alexander v. Gardner.-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), which
protect employees from being required to agree in advance.to arbitrate disputes under Title VII and to refrain from exercising theiFright to seek relief
section contemplates the use of voluntary arbiunder Title VII itself.
tration to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego statutory rights. No
approval whatsoever is intended ofthe Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gilbert [sic} v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991), or
any application or extension of it to Title VTI. llO

This

It is interesting to note that the House Committee on Education ai"1d
Labor specificallyrejected a Republican substitute provision which would
have encouraged the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms "in
place of judicial resolution" rather than as a supplement to the rights ar1d
remedies established by Title VII. 111 The Committee was troubled by the
fact that the Republican proposal would enable employers to "refuse to hire
workers unless they signed -a binding statement waiving all rights to file
Title VII complaints." 112 In rejecting this version of the bill, the House
Committee on Education and Labor stated the following:
[s]uch a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions holding that
workers have the right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important statutory and constitutional rights, including employment opporhmity rights. See, e.g., Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 note (1994).
109. 137 CoNG. REc. 815472, S15478 (daily ed. October 30, 1991) (statement of Senator Dole,
representing the views of the Bush administration, Senator Dole, and 13 other Senators) (emphasis
added). Senator Dole's analysis did not, however, discourage alternative means of dispute resolution as
a whole, for "[i]n light of the litigation crisis ... and the increasing sophistication and reliability of
alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums." !d.
110. 137 CoNG. REc. H9536 (daily ed. November 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
111. H. R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
642.
112. !d.
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U.S. 284 (1984). American workers should not be-forced to choose between their jobs and their civil rights. 113 .
Thus, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution, Congress did not intend to establish a fiat that arbitration be used whe~er or not employees have knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to it.
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities
Act 114 (ADA) contains a provision regarding alternative dispute resolution
proceedings. Section 513 of the ADA states that "[w]here· appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative :t;neans of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, :is· encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter." 115 .
The legislative history of this provision elucidates that it too was
meant to.encourage only voluntary means of alternative dispute resolution.
The House Conference Co1:nmittee Report explains that"[i]t is the intent' of
the conferees that the use of these alternative dispute resolution procedures
is completely voluntary. Under no condition would an arbitration clause in
a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract prevent an individual from pursuing their rights 11nper the AJ)A." 116 Similarly, the House
Judiciary Committee Report contains the following explication:
The Committee wishes to emphasize, however, that the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to flllJ'plement, not supplant, the
remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for example,. the Committee believes
that any agreement to submit disputed j.ssues to arbitration, whether in the_
context of a collective bargaining agreeri:J,ent or in an e1p.ployment contract,
does not preclude the affected person :fi:om seeking_reliefunder the eDrotcement provisions of this Act. . . . The Committee believes that the approach_
articulated by the Supreme Court Alexaiuler v. Gardner~De~ver Co, 117
applies equally to the-ADA and does not .intend that the inclusion of Section
513 be used to p~'clude rights and remedies that would otherwise be avail- .
able to persons with disabilities.U 8
The legislative histories of the provisions which address the arbitrability of employment discrimination claims reveal that Congress· did not
intend to preclude access to a judicial foiiun
sanctioning voluntary
agreements to arbitrate such disputes. Had the_ Gilmer case involved a
claim brought under the Civil Rights Act or the ADA and had the Court had

m

'by .

1!3. !d.
114. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (1995).
liS. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12212 (1995).
116. H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 598.
117. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
118. H. R. REP. No. 485 (III), JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 499-500.
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the opportunity to study the Ieiislative ·histories cited above, it may have
reached a different decision. The public policy defense, based on Congressional intent, provides a compelling argument against the enforcement of
compulsory. arbitration policies_ :which .include~ 'Yithin their scope. employment discrimination disputes.
In Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Lai, 119 the _Ninth Circuit vacated a
lower court's decision compelling arbitration withrespect to the plaintiffs'
Title VII claims and ruled that the ~bitration agreement in question was not
1:5mding~smce~tne plamtiffs-"l11fd~not"lilloWingly agreed to srtbnlit disputes to
arbitration. 120 . The plaintiffs. had signed a Securities IndustrY Registration
fotm ("U-4 form") stating that ~'I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise_betweenme or my firin, ora customer, or any
other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions,
or bylaws of the organizations with which I register." 121 The plaintiffs
eventually joined the. National Association of Securities Dealers. (NASD),
which requires that'disQutc;:s-~!arising iii connection Wi'ihthe business" of its
members be arbitrated, th()ugh fhe_\Vomen were.never given copies of the
NASD Manual, which contained the. terms of the arbitration agreement. 122
The Ninth Circuit quoted.theJegislative history of section 118 of the
Civil Rights_ Act of J 991, wbjch notes_ that arbitration is to be encouraged
only "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily _e,lect to use these methods."123 The court found that the ~'plaintiffs could not have understood that
in signing . _:. [the U'-4 form], they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination suits." 124 The Ninth:Circuitheld that because the plaintiffs did
not knowingly contract to forego their Title VII remedies in favor of arbitration, they could not be· bourid :by the ·aibl.tratiort '';1greement." 125
Since the Ninth 'Circuit has already refused· to enforce an arbitration
provision to vyhicl:t the cpniplainil1g, parties did not knowingly agree, it is
likely that this diculi, reiying ori tiie same legislative history, would also
invalidate an .arbitration policy to which employees did not voluntarily
agree. The Prudential case thus sets an important precedent in the battle
against coercive arbitration policies.
;

B.

- '

'

•

•••

r

'

Duress and Unconscionability

A unilaterally imposed cm:ilptllsory arbitration policy is also subject to
. challenge under the doctriiies ·afdritt!ss· and unconscicinability. "The re119. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 116 S.Ct. 6! (1995).
120. ld. at 1305.
-- 121. ld. at 1302.
122. ld. at 1301.
123. ld. at 1305, quoting 137 CoNG. REc. 815472, 815478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Dole); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305.
125. Jd.
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quirements for a showing of duress by threat·· can be grouped under four
headings. First, there must be a threat. Second, the threat must be improper. Third, the threat must induce the victim's manifestation of assent.
Fourth, it must be sufficiently grave to justify the victim's assent." 126
Employees who are threatened with termination if they fail to agree
prospectively to the arbitration of all claims against their employer, face an
improper threat in light of the FAA's section 1 exemption and the legislative history of civil rights legislation, both of which, as discussed above,
coritrirvene the eriforce~bility~of mandatory arbitration agreements. Moreover, the threat of unemployment in inany cases will induce employees to
agree to compulsory arbitration regardless of their opposition to the policy
and thus will constitute duress. In the Gilmer 'decision, the Supreme Court
urged that "courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort· of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds :for the revocation of any contract.' " 127 The Court rioted that Gilmer was well versed in the business
worldY8 By contrast, most employees, such as the medical technicians
employed by ROID,·are not sophisticated business people who are involved
in business negotiations on a daily basis. When threatened with loss of
their jobs, such employees or applicants for employment may acquiesce and
sign agreements to utilize arbitration simply to avoid adverse consequences,
including immediate job loss or harassment by management.
The related doctrine of unconscionability "has generally been recognized to include an· absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party." 129 When employees are forced to choose between signing an
arbitration agreement and losing their jobs, they are not faced with any
meaningful choice regarding arbitration. Moreover, an employer who unilaterally implements an arbitration policy is free to dictate the terms of arbitration and to establish arbitration procedures whiCh greatly disadvantage
employees.
In Gilmer, the Court noted that tht;: rules applicable to Gilmer's arbitration agreement provided numerous safeguards against ·biased arbitration
panels. 130 The rules required, for example, that the parties be informed of
each arbitrator's work history and be allowed to initiate further inquiries
126. I E.A. FARNswoRTH, CoNTRAcrs § 4.16 at 257 (1990).
127. Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (citations omitted).
128. Jd.
129. I E.A. FARNswoRTH, CoNTRAcrs § 4.28 at 314. See also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1982):
[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with tenns unreasonably favorable to the
stronger partY, may confirm indications ·that the transaction involved elements of deception or
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative,
or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
130. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
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into the arbitrators' backgrounds: 131 Each party was allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. 132 In addition, the arbitrators were required to disclose any circumstances which might impede
their objectivity and impartiality. 133 . Morebver, all arbitration decisions
were to be made public and .rendered in writing, including a specification of
the names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a
description of the award issued. 134 By detailing the features of the arbitration policy it was evaluating, the Supreme Court implicitly suggested that a
policy which did not Coiitai1Fsiniilat guarantees of fairness may not be considered as favorably and may be vulnenible to unconscionability challenges.
One indication of whether an .arbitration contract is unconscionable
may be the presence ot absence.:of consideration. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and
a consideration." 135 Unilaterally imposed arbitration p,olicies, such as that
implemented by ROID, typically do not provide employees with consideration for signing the policy, The employee is not paid additional salary or
given extra benefits for agreeing prospectively to arbitrate all disputes
which might arise.
It is arguable that under traditional contract principles, a distinction
should be made bet"vJ"een mandatory arbitration policies that are contained
in the initial employment contract signed by an employee at the commencement of his or her employment, and those which are implemented at some
later time. Presumably; if an employee signs an arbitration agreement contained in the employment contract, the employee is receiving the benefit of
employment itself as consideration for signing the contract. By contrast, an
employee who is forced to sign an arbitration agreement at some later time
during his or her tenure, receives no additional consideration in return for
the promise to arbitrate disputes. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
establishes that "[p]erformance of a legal c:Iuty owed to a promisor vvhich is
neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration." 136
Thus, continued employment should not be deemed to constitute consideration for an employee's agreement to sign a separate compulsory arbitration
policy. The position was already promised to the employee at the commencement of his or her emp1o):'l11ent and, assUilling that an employment
contract exists, the employer has a legal duty to allow the employee to retain his or her job for the contract period barring justifiable reasons for
termination.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

!d.
!d.
!d.
ld. at 31-32.
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS

§ 17(1) (1982).
§ 73 (1982).
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Thus; some courts may deem it acceptable for an employer to unilaterally impose a mandatory alternative dispute resolution policy on employees
at the time they are hired, if the courts are persuaded that employees received the job as consideration for agreeing.to arbitrate aU future disputes.
However, courts may look less favorably upon the implementation of a coercive policy at a later time, when the employee already has a vested interest in the job and certain expectations concerning his or her working
conditions. If forced to sign an arbitration policy implemented during his or
her tenure, the employee would receive no. separate consideration for waiving the right to use a traditional judicial forum. for purposes of dispute
.,
resolution.
This. distinction, however, js.notsupported..by the statutory language or
the legislative histories .of the FAA and the arbitration provisions contained
in the federal civil rights statutes. Nothing .in these sources establishes !1
basis for determining the validity of a coercive arbitration policy based
upon the time at which it was signed. Nevertheless, under contract law
principles, it may be easier to challenge a compulsory arbitration policy
which was established during an employee's tenure than one which was
imposed before the employee initiated his or her employment.
VI
CONCLUSION

The Gilmer decision has been perceived by some as precluding all
challenges to mandatory arbitration policies which are implemented by employers in the employment context. It must be recalled, however, that the
Gilmer case involved a third party agreement ·between aregistered securities agent and the New York Stock Exchange. 137 The Supreme Court explicitly eschewed any effort to construe the scope of the FAA's
exclusionary provision and provided no comment regarding the implications Of its decision upon direct employment contracts. 138
A December 1994 report issued by the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, appointed by Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich and Secretary of Commerce Ronald H ..•BroWn, · concluded that
mandatory arbitration policies shduld not 'be enforceable even if they are
established as part of the initial employment contract. 139 The report makes
the following recommendation: ·
· Binding arbitration agreements should not be enforceable as a condition of
employment. The Commission believes the courts should interpret the Federal Arbitration Act in this fashion. If they fail to do [so], Congress should
pass legislation making it clear that any choice between available methods
137. 500 U.S. at 23.
138. !d. at 25 n.2.
139. CoMMISSION oN THE FUTURE OF WoRKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Report and Recommendations (Dec., 1994).
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for enforcing statutory employment rights should be left to the individual
who feels wronged rather than dictated by his or her employment
contract. 140

This article does not· suggest that· employers should never implement
alternative dispute resolution policies. The advantages of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, namely the enhancement of efficiency, the expeditin·g· of dispute resolution, and the reduction .in the overall cost of the
pr()Cf:ediJ:!gs, 1llf1Y oft~g_J:l~llPPt:llli~g to both the employer and the .employee.
~:disprtter~sC>Ititi6n. programs. are tlius a commendable
option for work.;.related disputes so long as they are not coercive.
Employers are tinlikely to be challenged if they institute a policy by
which all disputes ,ate initially mediated at the· employer's expense. Since
mediation is by its nature non-binding, no employee rights would be sacrificed by an early attempt at settlement with the assistance of a professional
facilitator .. Claims which are hot settled would. simply,.. be pursued via ordinary litigation. Nevertheless, a mediaticin program may save employers
significant lo:iJ.g..;term costs; since disputes which are easily resolvable
would be eliminated quickly, witho11t prolonged litigation.
Similarly; arbitration programs which are voluritarily chosen by employees are not tinlaWful. ·Although the term "voluntary'' is somewhat malleable, employers might be able to prove voluntariness by showing that
employees were provided with literature regarding the potential advantages
and disadvantages of the arbitration procedures. Other indicia of voluntariness include allowing employees ample time to consult attorneys or other
advisors with respect to their choice, @d insuring. that employees who elect
not to pursue arbitration suffer no ill consequences as a result of their
decision.
Employers- would be. well ·advised to offer employees the option of
arbitration once they are informed of a particular di~pute. Thus the employee could evaluate his or her case and determine whether arbitration was
desirable in light of the particular matter at issue. Voluntariness may be
more difficult to prove in the case of arbitration policies which require employees to waive access to the courts prospectively, with respect to all disputes which may arise in the: course of their employment. However, if the
employer is able to prove that employees were educated with respect to the
pros and cons of arbitration and were given a meaningful choice as to
whether they wished to agreeto its utilization in all future claims they may
have against. their employer, the policy is likely to withstand scrutiny if
cliallenged, 141
·

Alternative

140. !d.
141. It is the EEOC's position, however, that regardless of any alternative dispute resolution program which might be implemented, employers cannot prevent employees from filing charges of discrimination with the· EEOC or a state enforcement agency. Furthermore, according to the EEOC, the
employer cannot hinder the government from investigating and prosecuting discrimination claims even
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By contrast, the unilateral impositibn of mandatory arbitration policies
upon employees who are given no choice but to accept such policies if they
wish to retain their jobs, vitiates many of the individual rights delineated in
the· employment discrimination statutes: These include. the right of access
to a federal or state court once administrative remedies have been exhausted
and the right to trial by a presumably impartial judge or jury. 142 The remedies and procedural protections available in arbitration proceedings may
differ vastly from those. available in state and federal courts. 143 As one
court has observed, ''the results .ofarbittatio:p. by private and untrained
'judges' are distantly remote from the fair process procedurally followed
and.application ·of principled law fotil:id in the judicial p'rocess." 144 These
differences ·may be particularly significant in emotionally charged cases
.such as those. involving claims of discrimination and civil rights violations.145 The statutory mandates of the civilrights laws andthe public policy commitment to the protection of.victims ofdiscrimination are certainly
rio less important than society's enthusiastn for judicialeconomy and for
the promotion of arbitration to that end. 146 In our eagerness for speed and
efficiency in the judicial system we must not default to a system of coercion
and must not lose sight of the primary purpose of all dispute resolution
mechanisms, that is, the promulgation of justice and equity.

if the parties have agreed to utiliZe mediation or arbitration With respect to the employee's allegations.
Wade Lambert, Lawsuit Against Kidder Peabody Sparks Court Fight with EEOC, WALL ST. J., March
24, 1995 at B6.
142: See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1994).
143. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 61 (1995). See also discussion supra p. 3.
144. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.I2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
476.U.S. 1141 (1986). The court further noted that "[n]o one ever deemed arbitration successful in labor
conflicts because of its superior brand of justice." /d.
145. Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305.
146. Jd.

